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An attorney at law is a person duly authorized to conduct
cases before the courts and act in both representative and ad-
visory capacities regarding legal matters.' In the conduct of
1. 1 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 10 (1914); LA. R.S. 37:212 (1950).
A person in Louisiana need not be represented in court by an attorney at law, for
he may appear either through an attorney at law, or in person to prosecute or
defend a suit in which he is involved. LA. R.S. 37:212 (1950) : "Nothing in this
Section prohibits any person from attending to and caring for his own business,
claims, or demands." See also Robert and Williams v. Commercial Bank, 13 La.
528 (1839).
This rule is generally followed in the United States. 7 C.J.S., Attorney and
Client, § 63 (1937). See also 6 C.J.S., Appearances, § 2 (1937) ; May v. Williams,
17 Ala. 23 (1849).
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litigation he is considered an officer of the court. An attorney
in fact is merely the agent of another, appointed to perform a
particular act or to carry on business in general for him and in
his place.2 One acting solely in the capacity of an attorney in fact
may not, as such, represent his principal before the courts.8 This
Comment deals only with the relation between the Louisiana
attorney at law and his client; problems involving the relation
between the attorney in fact and his principal are beyond its
scope. 4
The attorney-client relation is fiduciary in nature. It im-
poses upon the attorney the duty of dealing with his client only
on the basis of strict fidelity and honor, and involves the highest
personal trust and confidence by the client in his attorney, but
of course the attorney is not compelled to act for every person
who may desire his services.6 In spite of the highly fiduciary
nature of the relation, an attorney may represent both parties
to a suit if there is express consent of all concerned after a full
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2985 (1870) ; 1 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 19
(1914).
3. If the attorney in fact is also a member of the bar, he may appear in court
for his principal if duly authorized, but he does so in his capacity as an attorney
at law, not as an attorney in fact. In the past, Louisiana cases have held that
a suit could be brought or defended by an authorized attorney in fact, even though
he was not a licensed attorney at law. Wright's Estate v. Waterbury, .146 La. 49,
83 So. 374 (1919) ; Adamietz v. Pontiff, 146 La. 48, 83 So. 373 (1919) ; Brown v.
Guillot, 146 La. 46, 82 So. 373 (1919); Howell v. Mundy, 145 La. 291, 83 So.
274 (1919). The holding in the Mundy case, which was the precedent for the
other decisions, was 'based on LA. R.S. § 122 (1870) : "The parties to any suit
pending before any court of this state, shall have the right to appear and plead
in person, or by their attorney at law or in fact." However, this provision was
repealed by La. Acts 1932, No. 202, § 10, and the area is now covered by LA. R.S.
37:212, 213 (1950). That a suit could be brought by a properly authorized attor-
ney in fact was held to be strongly implied by the language of LA. CODE OF PRAC-
TICE art. 320 (1870) ; Reisz v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 148 La. 929, 933, 88
So. 120, 121 (1921).
However, it would seem that today, under the provisions of LA. R.S. 37:212-
213 (1950), an attorney in fact could not represent his principal in court. LA.
R.S. 37:212 (1950) : "The practice of law is defined as follows: (1) In a repre-
sentative capacity, the appearance as an advocate, or the drawing of papers, plead-
ings or documents, or the performance of any act in connection with proceedings,
pending or prospective, before any court of record in this state." LA. R.S. 37:213
(1950) : "No natural person, who has not been first duly and regularly licensed
and admitted to practice law by the Supreme Court of this state . . . shall . . .
(5) Render or furnish legal services or advice."
These two provisions prohibit the very acts necessary for representation; they
do not, as did the former statutes, prohibit appearance of an unlicensed person in
the capacity of an attorney at law or the practice of law without a license.
4. Therefore, whenever the word "attorney" is used, it refers to an attorney
at law, not to an attorney in fact.
5. Searcy v. Novo, 188 So. 490, 498 (La. App. 1939) ; In re Clifton, 115 Fla.
168, 155 So. 324 (1934).
6. 21 LA. R.S. ANN. '399, Articles of Incorporation, Louisiana State Bar Asso-
ciation art. 14, § 31 (West 1950). Under the LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2989 (1870),
acceptance of the power of attorney may be either express or tacit.
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disclosure of material facts ;7 this rule is in accordance with
the general principles of agency regarding representation of con-
flicting interests.8
To facilitate the presentation of the major aspects of the
attorney-client relation, this Comment, is divided into three
parts: the creation of the relation and the method of proving its
existence, its termination, and the scope of the attorney's au-
thority to act during its existence.
CREATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION AND PROVING THE
ATTORNEY'S AUTHORITY
Creation of the Relation
The relation of attorney and client is created only when there
is an express or implied contract for the professional services
of an attorney at law. This contract is usually called a "retainer"
and may be either general or special in scope. A "general re-
tainer" covers the services of a particular attorney or firm of
attorneys for any future situation where legal advice or service
may be necessary or desirable; whereas, a "special retainer"
provides for the attorney's or firm's services in regard to one
particular problem or case.9 Although either type of retainer
may be gratuitous, such contracts usually provide for compensa-
tion to the attorney.10
7. 21 LA. R.S. ANN. 391, Articles of Incorporation, Louisiana State Bar Asso-
ciation art. 14, § 6 (West 1950): "It is unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests, except by express consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the
facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose.
"The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to
divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retain-
ers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the
client with respect to which confidence has been reposed."
Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3016-3017 (1870) (broker may represent both parties
and negotiate matters between them). See also 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1457
(1951).
8. MECTEM, OUTLINES OF TIE LAW OF AGENCY § 502 (4th ed. 1952); RE-
STATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 23, 381, Comment (d), 392 (1933).
9. 1 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW §§ 133-134 (1914). For general forms of
contracts, see 1 AM. JUR., Legal Forms Ann., 1801-1804 (1953). For jury in-
struction on the creation of the attorney-client relations, see 2 Am. JuR., Plead-
ing and Practice Forms 1203-1204 (1956).
10. Gurley v. New Orleans, 41 La. Ann. 75, 78-79, 5 So. 659, 660-61 (1889)
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2991 (1870). With one exception a necessary condition to
the recovery of compensation either under contract or on a quantum meruit, due
to termination of the contract, is that the attorney must prove the creation of the
relation of attorney and client by showing an express or implied contract for his
services. Succession of Morvant, 46 La. Ann. 301, 14 So. 922 (1894) ; Wailes and
Mathews v. Succession of Brown, 27 La. Ann. 411 (1875) ; Cooley and Lacoste
692 (Vol. XVIII
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The fact situations in which a retainer will be implied are
numerous. For example, payment of part of the attorney's fee
by the alleged client and the acceptance by him of the benefits
of the attorney's efforts,1 or correspondence between the at-
torney and client indicating an intention that the attorney should
represent the client in a particular matter, 12 are evidence of a
retainer. 3
Proving the Attorney's Authority
As a general rule an attorney at law who institutes a suit is
presumed to have authority to act for his client and to represent
him in court.' 4 The oath of the attorney is enough to give rise to
a presumption that he has authority to appear. 15 Authority has
been presumed for an attorney to appear for a corporation, 6 to
conduct a cross examination on a deposition,' 7 and to act for
v. Cecile, 8 La. Ann. 51 (1853) ; Roselius v. Delachaise, 5 La. Ann. 481 (1850).
See also 2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 507 (1914). The exception to his
rule arises when the client knowingly acquiesces in his attorney's unauthorized
acts or knowingly accepts the benefits thereof; in this instance the attorney may
be allowed compensation without being required to prove a prior contract for his
services. 2 THORNTON, op. cit. supra, at §§ 507-508. See particularly p. 715 infra.
11. Massey v. Murray, 17 La. App. 319 (1931) (where attorney was not al-
lowed to collect the balance of his fee from a stockholder for services rendered
in the organization and operation of the company) ; Kennedy v. Consumers Ice
Co., 7 La. App. 446 (1928) (where president of a corporation had employed at-
torney without approval of the board of directors for the purpose of liquidation
of the company).
12. Succession of Hardesty, Manning's Unreported Cases 111. Of. Milligan v.
Alabama Fertilizer Co., 89 Ala. 322, 7 So. 650 (1890).
13. Evidence is inadequate to imply a contract between an attorney and client
where the attorney's testimony as to his appointment conflicts with that of the
only other person present at the time. Succession of LeBlanc, 2 La. App. 364
(1925). Where an attorney attempted to collect his fee from a brother of the
accused in a criminal prosecution, the attorney's failure to mention his intention
to collect his fee from the brother and his attempt to collect from the accused first
was considered to bar him from establishing a contract with the brother. Landry
v. White, 146 So. 509 (La. App. 1933). For other examples of when contracts
will be implied, see 2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW §§ 513-517 (1914).
14. Interdiction of Erichson, 149 La. 895, 90 So. 235 (1921); Postal Tele-
graph Cable Co. v. Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Ry., 43 La. Ann. 522, 9
So. 119 (1891) ; Simpson v. Lombas, 14 La. Ann. 103 (1859); Succession of
Patrick, 20 La. Ann. 204 (1868); Tipton v. Mayfield's Curator, 10 La. 189
(1836) ; Bonnefoy v. Landry, 4 Rob. 23 (La. 1843) ; Rowlett v. Shepherd, 7
Mart.(N.S.) 513 (La. 1829) ; Hayes v. Cuny, 9 Mart.(O.S.) 87 (La. 1820).
15. One case states that "the mere affirmation of a reputable attorney that
he is the retained counsel in a cause has the sanctity of an oath .... The record
and the allegations of counsel import absolute verity as respects the authority
to represent their clients." Brigot's Heirs v. Brigot, 47 La. Ann. 1304, 1307, 17
So. 825, 826 (1895).
16. Postal Telegraphic Cable Co. v. Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Ry.,
43 La. Ann. 522, 9 So. 119 (1891) ; Community Chest of Caddo & Bossier Par-
ishes v. Union Mission Ass'n, 30 So.2d 131 (La. App. 1947) (rehearing denied).
17. Kelly v. Benedict, 5 Rob. 138 (La. 1843).
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both members of a partnership in a bankruptcy proceeding al-
though his acts were specifically authorized by only one of the
partners.1 8 An attorney from another state however is not pre-
sumed to have authority to appear for his client in the Louisiana
courts.19
The presumption as to the attorney's authority to appear and
represent his client is, in Louisiana, as in most jurisdictions,
rebuttable. The issue may be raised by any party to a suit 20 by
exception supported by an affidavit alleging facts sufficient "to
render it probable that the [attorney's] action is unauthorized."'2'
The effect of this procedure is to shift the burden of proving
the attorney's authority to the party seeking to sustain it, rather
than compelling the party challenging such authority to disprove
18. Meridian Fertilizer Factory v. Collier, 193 La. 815, 192 So. 358 (1939).
The court is careful to indicate that both members of the partnership were bene-
fited by the attorney's action. In dictum the court has also indicated that an
appearance as attorney of record for a party in the place where he resides would
give rise to a presumption that the attorney had been employed to represent the
party. Roselius v. Delachaise, 5 La. Ann. 481 (1850).
19. Wetmore v. Daffin, 5 La. Ann. 496 (1850). See also LA. R.S. 37:214-216
(1950) (prohibiting practice of law in Louisiana by attorneys of other states,
unless they are either licensed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, associated with
a Louisiana attorney, or from a state allowing reciprocity to a Louisiana attor-
ney). One reason for this rule is to protect the client, for although it may be
inferred that he authorized his attorney to act for him in the state in which the
attorney is licensed and familiar with the law, such authorization cannot be
inferred for him to appear in a state where he is not familiar with the law or the
jurisprudence. Another possible reason for the rule is to protect the Louisiana
courts from delay or inconvenience which might be caused by attorneys not famil-
iar with our law.
20. As very few Louisiana cases make any distinction as to which party is
questioning the attorney's authority, and cases in each category are cited (occa-
sionally with mention of the distinction) as authority in the other (see New
Orleans v. Steinhardt, 52 La. Ann. 1043, 27 So. 586 (1900) ; Bender v. McDowell,
46 La. Ann. 393, 15 So. 21 (1894) ; Dockham v. Potter, 27 La. Ann. 73 (1875) ;
Plaquemines Parish School Board v. Davis, 32 So.2d 391 (La. App. 1947) ; Re-
construction Finance Corp. v. Cotonio, 184 So. 252 (La. App. 1938) (distinction
mentioned)), it appears that the rules developed by the Louisiana jurisprudence
regarding such challenge are the same no matter which party questions the attor-
neys' authority. The Louisiana procedure is contrary to that in some jurisdic-
tions which do not allow one party to compel the opponent's attorney to prove
his authority (see 5 AM. JUR., Attorneys at Law, § 82, n. 6 (1936)). Generally
speaking, however, the Louisiana rules on proving the authority of the attorney
at law seem to be in harmony with those applied in most states (see 5 AM. JuR.,
Attorneys at Law, §§ 79-84 (1936) ; Annot., 88 A.L.R. 12, 15 (1934)).
For general forms relating to the attorney's authority, see 2 AM. JUR., Plead-
ing and Practice Forms, No. 1171 (notice of motion to compel attorney to show
authority) ; § 1172 (affidavit in support of motion) ; No. 1174 (attorney's affidavit
as to authority) (1956).
21. Bonnefoy v. Landry, 4 Rob. 23, 25 (1843) ; Gigand v. New Orleans, 52 La.
Ann. 1259, 27 So. 794 (1900) ; New Orleans v. Steinhardt, 52 La. Ann. 1043, 27
So. 586 (1900) ; Dockham v. Potter, 27 La. Ann. 73, 75 (1875) ; Succession of
Patrick, 20 La. Ann. 204 (1868) ; Dangerfield's Executrix v. Thurston's Heirs, 8
Mart. (N.S.) 232, 236 (La. 1829); Smith v. Maier, 16 So.2d 682 (La. App. 1944).
Of. Legere v. Richard, 10 La. Ann. 669 (1855) (dictum).
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its existence.22 To be sufficient the affidavit must contain an
oath that the facts stated are true. An affidavit either by an
attorney,23 or by a party to the suit24 based on information,
knowledge, and belief will be considered insufficient. The affi-
davit of a party will also be insufficient if he has failed to deny,
within a reasonable time, the attorney's authority to appear for
him.2 5
Although many cases seem to indicate that the presumption
of the attorney's authority can be rebutted only by affidavit,2
the contrary has been clearly held.27 The degree of proof deemed
sufficient varies, of course, with the facts of each case. In
Bender v. McDoweUl28 the party denying his attorneys' authority
to appear for him in a prior case was able to show that he had
never "employed" the attorneys, had never talked to them, and
that he had no knowledge of the case until eight years after
judgment had been rendered against him. This evidence was
considered sufficient to rebut the former attorneys' presumed
authority and the judgment was held to be a nullity. A presump-
22. Police Jury of Tangipahoa Parish v. Begnaud, 200 La. 1020, 9 So.2d 399
(1942) ; Dockham v. Potter, 27 La. Ann. 73, 74 (1875) ; Johnson v. Brandt,
10 Mart.(O.S.) 638, 639 (1821); Dangerfield's Executrix v. Thurston's Heirs,
8 Mart.(N.S.) 232, 236 (La. 1829) ("the party who has been represented with-
out his consent, or contrary to his wishes, is sufficiently protected by allowing
him to deny the authority of the attorney on oath; and on his doing so requiring
from his adversary proof of it" (emphasis added)).
23. Police Jury of Tangipahoa Parish v. Begnaud, 200 La. 1020, 9 So.2d 399
(1942) ; Boykin v. Holden, 6 La. Ann. 120 (1851) ; Plaquemines Parish School
Board v. Davis, 32 So.2d 391 (La. App. 1947).
24. Bonnefoy v. Landry, 4 Rob. 23, 25 (La. 1843). As the reason for their
holding the court states: "If it were sufficient merely to swear to an impression
or belief, the existence of which in the mind of the party could never be disproved,
the presumption in favor of the authority of attorneys at law would be entirely
done away with, as such an affidavit might be made by every party whose object
was delay."
25. Mason v. Stewart, 6 La. Ann. 736 (1851). It appears to be virtually a
uniform rule that wherb the party is guilty of laches he will not be allowed to
deny the authority of the attorney who appeared for him. Annot., 88 A.L.R. 12,
62 (1934).
26. See note 21 supra.
27. Wadsworth v. Alexius, 234 La. 187, 99 So.2d 77, 82 (1958) ("However,
any presumption resulting from the appearance of counsel in plaintiff's behalf
was completely overcome by direct evidence that plaintiff neither employed counsel
to represent her nor authorized the employment" (emphasis added) ) ; Hill v. Bow-
den, 3 La. Ann. 258 (1848) ("We have repeatedly held, that the acts of attornies
[sic] will be presumed to have been authorized by their clients, unless the latter,
by their own affidavit or otherwise, show that the attorney transcended his au-
thority" (emphasis added)) ; Fisher v. Moore, 12 Rob. 95, 98 (La. 1845) (where
plaintiff had not denied attorney's authority on oath, and where a judgment which
upheld his authority was reversed on the ground that "the circumstances disclosed
by the record, throw some doubt on the fairness of the trial below, and the
authority of the counsel who undertook to conduct it on the part of the war-
rantors").
28. Bender v. McDowell, 46 La. Ann. 393, 15 So. 21 (1894).
696 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
tion of "employment" was overcome in Roselius v. Delachaise2
by a showing that the defendant had retained other lawyers to
manage the case on which plaintiff (attorney) sought to collect
his fee, and that the attorney had been engaged by others with
an interest in the case. 80 In the foregoing examples the attor-
ney's authority to represent his client in a prior action was in
question; however, his authority may certainly be challenged
while the action is still pending.81
Where an attorney at law acts as an agent, but not in a pro-
fessional capacity, his authority to so act will not be presumed,
but must be proved as in other cases of agency.82 Where there
is specific authorization given an attorney in a recorded au-
thentic act, evidence of private correspondence revoking his
authority is of no effect against third persons entitled to rely
on the public records.88
Effect of an unauthorized appearance. In most jurisdictions
a judgment rendered as a result of an appearance by an un-
authorized attorney will not bind a defendant who can show that
he had a valid defense to the action. 34 In Louisiana, if the de-
fendant can prove that the attorney's appearance was unau-
thorized, a judgment rendered in the suit will not be binding on
him regardless of whether or not he had a valid defense. 85
29. 5 La. Ann. 481 (1850).
30. But evidence of an attorney's former withdrawal from a case, as attorney
for one of two plaintiffs therein, has been held insufficient evidence to destroy the
presumption of his authority, because, as the court pointed out, he may have re-
entered the case after his withdrawal. Interdiction of Erichson, 149 La. 895, 90
So. 235 (1921).
31. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Steinhardt, 52 La. Ann. 1043, 27 So. 586 (1900);
Wood & Roane v. Wood, 32 La. Ann. 801 (1880) ; Hill v. Bowden, 3 La. Ann.
258 (1848).
32. Succession of Barr, 8 La. Ann. 458 (1853).
33. Girard v. Hirsch, 6 La. Ann. 651 (1851). For a discussion of what evi-
dence is considered sufficient or insufficient in other jurisdictions to repel the
presumption of the attorney's authority to appear, see Annot., 88 A.L.R. 12, 62-
68 (1934).
34. Shelton v. Tiffin, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 162, 186 (1848) ; Annot., 88 A.L.R.
12, 62-68 (1934).
35. Marvel v. Manouvrier, 14 La. Ann. 3 (1859) (affidavit that attorney was
without authority was filed in the action to set aside former judgment). See also
-Bender v. McDowell, 46 La. Ann. 393, 15 So. 21 (1894) (no affidavit filed)
Barnes v. Profilet, 5 La. Ann. 117 (1850) ; LA. CrvmI CODE art. 3010 (1870).
One Louisiana case applied the old common law rule that in unauthorized ap-
pearance cases "the judgment is not null and void by reason of want of authority
of the attorney who filed the plea, but . . . is still regular, leaving to the party
his action at law against the officer for damages, and his right in equity to enjoin
the execution of the judgment establishing a meritorious defense." Walworth v.
Hinderson, 9 La. Ann. 339, 340 (1854), citing Cox v. Nichols, 2 Yeates 546 (Pa.
1800). However, this case dealt with an application of Mississippi law, and it
was held that it could have no application to a case arising in Louisiana courts.
Marvel v. Manouvrier, supra at 4.
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Necessity of written evidence of attorney's authority. Since
a contract for legal services is usually considered a mandate or
a hiring,36 it may be either written or verbal.3 7 However, the
general rule of agency that, where a contract is required by law
to be in writing, the power of the agent to execute it must be in
writing, applies to contracts between attorney and client in Lou-
isiana s8
TERMINATION OF THE RELATION AND COMPENSATION OF
THE ATTORNEY
A number of Louisiana cases have dealt with the question of
whether the attorney-client relation constitutes a hiring of labor
or a mandate. The importance of this question lies in the fact
that if the contract is considered a "hiring" and is terminated
by the client without cause, the attorney may recover the balance
of any compensation due him under the terms of the contract,89
36. See p. 692 supra.
37. If the contract is considered a mandate, LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2992 (1870)
provides: "A power of attorney may be given, either by a public act or by a
writing under private signature, even by letter.
"It may also be given verbally, but of this testimonial proof is admitted only
conformably to the title: Of Conventional Obligations." In Searcy v. Novo, 188
So. 490 (La. App. 1939), the court, by admitting parol evidence of the authority
of an agent to retain an attorney at law, implied that a contract with an attor-
ney at law authorizing him to conduct litigation may be made verbally.
If the contract is considered a hiring, neither the general articles on Lease
(LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2668-2675 (1870)), nor those on hiring (id. arts. 2745-
2750) require it to be in writing. It may therefore be inferred that a contract
of hiring may be made orally, as is the common practice, and as is permitted for
the lease of a thing (id. art. 2683).
38. If the attorney is given the power to alienate immovables, the agreement
granting him this power must be in writing. Id. art. 2992 (testimonial proof of
an oral contract is admissible only as permitted for conventional obligations).
Lake v. LeJeune, 226 La. 48, 53, 74 So.2d 899, 901 (1954) ; Bordelon v. Crab-
tree, 216 La. 345, 43 So.2d 682 (1949) ; Milburn v. Wemple, 156 La. 759, 101
So. 132 (1924). See cases cited note 97 infra. But cf. Etie's Heirs v. Cade, 4 La.
383 (1832) (where an attorney at law at the request of plaintiff's agent, had im-
movables sold to pay debts of a succession, and plaintiffs had actual notice and
knowledge of the sale and had placed titles in agent's hands, plaintiffs were
estopped from denying the agent's authority to have the immovables sold).
Although LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3071 (1870) states: "[T]his Contract [of
Compromise] must be reduced to writing," it has been held that "the authority of
the agent to compromise for his principal should be in writing, though this is not
indispensable save when title to real estate is involved." Van Vleet Mansfield
Drug Co. v. Anders, 157 So. 166, 167 (La. App. 1934).
In common law jurisdictions contracts for the employment of attorneys will
be governed by principles of the Statute of Frauds as modified by state statutes.
For a brief note on attorney's employment contracts, not intended to be performed
within a year, see Annot., 15 L.R.A.(N.S.) 326 (1908).
39. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2749 (1870) : "If without serious ground of complaint,
a man should send away a laborer whose services he has hired for a certain time,
before that time has expired, he shall be bound to pay to such laborer the whole
of the salaries which he would have been entitled to receive, had the full term of
his services arrived."
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but if the contract is considered a "mandate," it is revocable at
the will of the client, and he need pay the attorney only the rea-
sonable value of his services to the moment of termination.
40 It
appears that three factors are considered in determining the
nature of the relationship: (1) the term of the contract, (2)
the character of the fee, and (3) the nature of the attorney's
services.
Termination in General
The general rules as to termination of agency, or mandate,
apply to the attorney-client relation except in the situation where
the contract is treated as one of a hiring of labor. Generally
speaking, an agency may be terminated: (1) by an act of either
or both parties, or (2) by operation of law. Termination may
take place in the former instance either: (a) according to the
original agreement between the parties, such as by the passing
of a stipulated time, the happening of a certain event, or the ac-
complishment of the object of the agency, or (b) it may occur
by an act of either or both parties subsequent to their original
agreement, such as revocation by the principal, renunciation by
the agent, or mutual consent of both parties. Termination by
operation of law occurs as a result of death, bankruptcy, inter-
diction, or seclusion of either the principal or agent.41
Power of the Client to Terminate the Relation
When the attorney is engaged on a contingent fee basis, the
client's termination of the relation may prevent the attorney's
completion of the case. In such event the problem arises whether
termination of the attorney's power to represent the client also
terminates his right to recover compensation under the terms
of the contract, and if so, whether the attorney may recover for
services rendered up to the time of revocation other than under
the contract. Under the jurisprudence, the solution to this prob-
lem depends on whether the contract is considered one of hiring
or mandate.
The major function of a mandatary is to perform juridical
acts that affect the principal's legal relations with third parties.
40. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3028 (1870): "Except in the case of irrevocable
powers of attorney, as described in the preceding article, the principal may revoke
his power of attorney, whenever he thinks proper."
41. Id. art. 3027. For a comprehensive discussion of termination of agency in
Louisiana by act of the parties, see Comment, 22 TuL. L. REV. 623 (1948). For
termination 'by operation of law, see Comment, 25 TuL. L. REV. 249 (1951).
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By virtue of the provisions of the Code his services are gra-
tuitous unless otherwise stipulated, and any compensation which
he receives is considered an honorarium, not a salary. On the
other hand, an employee's function is not to perform juridical
acts in the name of his employer, binding him to third persons,
but merely to work for him, for which he receives a salary as
compensation. 42 Following this reasoning in Gurley v. New Or-
leans,43 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that an attorney at
law acting as assistant counsel for the city was to be considered
a mandatary because he was vested with the power to represent
the party for whom he acted. Thus, as a general proposition, a
contract for legal services is considered a mandate under Civil
Code Article 302844 because of the power of the attorney at law
to represent his client in dealings with third persons. The result
of so classifying the attorney-client relationship is to make it
revocable at the will of the client.45 If the power of the attorney
is revoked, he may recover the reasonable value of services ren-
dered up to the time revocation takes place.46 However, this gen-
eral principal does not apply :47 where the retainer constitutes a
hiring of labor within the provisions of Article 2749; where the
attorney is appointed in a will; where the power of the attorney
is coupled with an interest; and where the contract between the
parties stipulates that neither the attorney nor the client may
dispose of the case without the consent of the other.48 These four
exceptions will be discussed in the remaining paragraphs of this
section.
To be considered a hiring under the provisions of Civil Code
Article 2749 and thus not revocable at the will of the employer,4
a contract for services must be for a certain time and for a
fixed salary. When an attorney is retained for a definite period
at a fee of a certain amount, the contract will constitute a hiring
42. 2 PLANIOL, TRAITt ILtlMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL §§ 3019-3020 (4th ed.
1952) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2991 (1870).
43. 41 La. Ann. 75, 5 So. 659 (1889). This holding is weakened to some
extent by an alternative holding used to support the court's decision.
44. See note 40 supra.
45. Succession of Robinson, 188 La. 742, 178 So. 337 (1937) ; Gurley v. New
Orleans, 41 La. Ann. 75, 5 So. 659 (1889) ; Crane v. Sladovich, Docket No. 7680,
Teissier's Digest of Unreported Decisions 25 (La. App. 1923).
46. Foster, Hall, Barret & Smith v. Haley, 174 La. 1019, 142 So. 251 (1932)
Succession of LeBlanc, 2 La. App. 364 (1925).
47. Irrevocable powers of attorney, as enumerated in Article 3027 of the Louisi-
ana Civil Code, are not considered in this Comment.
48. This stipulation must comply in all respects with LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950).
For the provisions of this statute, see note 69 infra.
49. See note 39 supra.
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if the attorney is not required to act in a representative ca-
pacity.50 Thus, an annual retainer to advise and counsel in re-
turn for a stipulated annual fee has been considered a hiring
rather than a mandate."' If the client terminates such a con-
tract without cause before the time stated therein has elapsed,
he must pay the attorney any balance due under the terms of
the contract. No cases have been found where an attorney was
retained at a stated fee per month, the retainer to continue for
an indefinite period. If an attorney under such a contract were
later discharged during the course of any month, having been
paid up to the first of the month, the problem would arise
whether he could recover only the reasonable value of services
rendered during the month, or the whole of the monthly fee
stipulated in the contract.52 As previously indicated, if the con-
tract is considered one of hiring, he may recover the stipulated
fee; if considered one of mandate, then recovery will be limited
to the reasonable value of the services rendered for which no
compensation has been paid. If the attorney is not acting in a
representative capacity, it could well be argued that such a
contract is a hiring. This result might be rationalized by con-
sidering the period of one month to be, in effect, a definite term,
or by drawing an analogy to the lease of a thing by the month.58
50. The question of whether an attorney-client contract for a certain time and
a fixed fee would be considered a hiring if the attorney were engaged to act in a
representative capacity appears to be unsettled. However, following the principle
recognized in the Gurley case that one acting in a representative capacity is a
mandatary, it would seem that if an attorney were required to act in such a
capacity the contract would be properly considered a mandate even though it was
for a definite period and at a stated fee, certain in amount.
51. Orphan Asylum v. Mississippi Marine Ins. Co., 8 La. 181 (1835)
Advisory Opinion No. 5, 5 TUL. L. REV. 605, 607 (1931). The question
in the Orphan A.ylum case was whether an attorney under a retainer for
one year at $500 was to be considered a hired servant under the provisions
of LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2718 (1825) (LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2747 (1870)) or a
laborer hired for a fixed term under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2720 (1825) (LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 2749 (1870)). The court held the attorney's contract to be within
Article 2720 of the Civil Code of 1825, the general rule, not within Article 2718,
which was held to be an exception to the general rule.
There seem to be no other Louisiana cases exactly in point. I-land v. West,
28 La. Ann. 145 (1876) (action by minor's tutor for balance due on a contract
of indenture) and Shoemaker v. Bryan, 12 La. Ann. 697 (1857) (action by a
steamboat pilot to recover wages) are not authority for the contention that the
attorney-client relation is a hiring of services, notwithstanding the statement to
this effect in Comment, 22 TUL. L. REV. 623, 633, n. 88 (1948).
Cases in many common law jurisdictions also hold that the client is not privi-
leged to terminate at will the employment of an attorney retained at a specified
compensation and for a definite period. Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 677, 679 (1955).
52. As an illustration of this situation, suppose the attorney is retained on
January 1, at $100 per month, no term being agreed upon. If he is dismissed
on March 15, having been paid for January and February, what compensation is
he entitled to recover for March?
53. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2685 (1870).
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On the other hand, if the attorney is representing his client, the
contract should be considered a mandate. Recent cases have
dealt only with situations where the contract between attorney
and client was properly considered one of mandate, and it is
possible that the court would apply the same reasoning to the
contract presented here, whether the attorney was acting in a
representative capacity or not.
When a contract, not complying with R.S. 37:218, is for the
rendition of particular legal services requiring that the attorney
act in a representative capacity for an indefinite time, the rela-
tion comes within the general rule, being considered a mandate
which the client may revoke upon paying the attorney the rea-
sonable value of his services rendered prior to the time of revo-
cation. This rule applies where the attorney is retained on a con-
tingent fee, 54 or for a stated sum,5 5 or where the fee consists of
fixed amounts which are dependent upon the degree of success
in litigation.5 6
However, there are two cases which cannot be reconciled
with the foregoing analysis. In United Gas Public Service Co.
v. Christian,57 on a contract providing for a contingent fee, and
in D'Avricourt v. Seeger,5 8 on a fixed fee contract, recovery was
allowed on the grounds that the client's action in breaching the
contract prevented the attorney from performing thereunder,
54. Planters' Lumber Co. v. Sugar Cane By-Products Co., 162 La. 123, 110
So. 172 (1926) ; Louque v. Dejan, 129 La. 519, 56 So. 427 (1911) ; Woodley V.
Robinson, 100 So.2d 255, 257 (La. App. 1958) ; Thalheim v. City of Gretna, 171
So. 591 (La. App. 1937) ; Gosserand v. Crispo, Docket No. 7829, Teissier's Digest
of Unreported Decisions 25 (La. App. 1923). But see Bermudez v. Heath, 20 La.
Ann. 172 (1868) (impliedly overruled in Louque v. Dejan, id. at 523, 56 So. at
428).
55. Shiro v. Macaluso, 13 La. App. 88, 126 So. 244 (1930) (cert. denied);
Advisory Opinion No. 5, 5 TuL. L. REV. 605 (1931). But cf. Angelloz v. Rivollet,
2 La. Ann. 652 (1847) (recovery is allowed under contract, but it is not shown
whether plaintiff is an attorney at law) ; Hennen v. Bourgeat, 12 Rob. 522 (La.
1846) (court does not state whether contract is considered a hiring or a mandate;
recovery of the stipulated fee appears to be under the contract; but it might have
been on a quantum meruit, as the attorney's failure to take action was considered
to his client's advantage in this instance. This case was superficially distinguished
in Shiro v. Macaluso, 13 La. App. 88, 91, 126 So. 244, 246 (1930).
56. Succession of Mariana, 177 So. 464 (La. App. 1937) (quantum meruit
recovery for entire fee as all required services had been rendered). This holding
may possibly explain Hennen v. Bourgeat, 12 Rob. 522 (La. 1846), discussed note
55 supra.
57. 186 La. 689, 173 So. 174 (1937) (fee was stipulated as "one half interest
in any judgment that may be obtained." Although the court seemed to consider
this contingent fee as a power coupled with an interest, such a holding would be
clearly contrary to the jurisprudence. See note 68 infra. The decision was based
upon breach of contract by client).
58. 169 La. 620, 125 So. 735 (1929) (fixed fee of $10,000).
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and that therefore under the provision of Civil Code Article
2040,59 the contract was to be considered as having been per-
formed by the attorney. These two decisions are based on a gen-
eral principal of contract law as enunciated in Lloyd v. Dick-
son,6° a case which did not involve the attorney-client relation.
Although justice to the parties appears to have been achieved by
allowing full recovery on the contract by the attorneys in each
of these cases, it is submitted that these decisions are out of har-
mony with the vast majority of cases involving the attorney-
client relation, and that it would be better to apply the general
rule of mandate in such cases.61
The second exception to the rule that the relationship consti-
tutes a mandate terminable at will appears where an attorney at
law is designated in a testament as the attorney to settle the
estate. In such a case a special relation arises between the heirs
and the attorney, which is considered neither a hiring nor a man-
date, with the result that the heirs are powerless to revoke the
attorney's authority.
2
The third exception to the general rule occurs when, although
there has been no compliance with the contingency fee statute,
the attorney's power to represent his client is coupled with a
present interest in the subject matter with which the relation is
concerned. A power coupled with an interest is more than a
mere power over the subject matter of the agency, but consists
of "a property in the thing which is the subject of the agency.'0 s
59. "The condition is considered as fulfilled, when the fulfillment of it has been
prevented by the party bound to perform it."
60. 116 La. 90, 40 So. 542 (1906).
61. For a very recent decision in accord with this recommendation, see Wood-
ley v. Robinson, 100 So.2d 255 (La. 1958). Here the contract between attorney
and client, drawn in accordance with the provisions of LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950)
(statute is set out in full in note 69 infra), stipulated that neither party could
dismiss the case without the consent of the other. Because the contract was not
filed with the clerk of court as required by the statute, client's dismissal without
attorney's consent was held effective; however, attorney was allowed to recover on
a quantum meruit for his services to the date of dismissal.
Client's action was a clear breach of the non-dismissal stipulation of the con-
tract. This provision is binding as between the parties whether the contract is
filed or not, for the purpose of filing, as required by the statute, is to give third
persons notice of attorney's interest in the suit, not to provide a party to the
contract a means of avoiding the very provision to which he has consented.
62. Rivet v. Battistella, 167 La. 766, 120 So. 289 (1929) ; Untermier v. Ernest,
2 La. App. 163 (1925). See also Shiro v. Macaluso, 13 La. App. 88, 91, 126 So.
244, 246 (1930) (cert. denied) (provision in will "was equivalent to an onerous
legacy").
63. Marchand v. Gulf Refining Co., 187 La. 1002, 1007, 175 So. 647, 649
(1937), quoting from Fowler v. Phillips, 159 La. 668, 672-73, 106 So. 26, 28
(1925) ; Tennant v. Russell, 214 La. 1046, 1052, 39 So.2d 726, 728 (1949) ; Corn-
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In Louisiana, if the attorney's power of representation is to be
irrevocable, both the power of representation and the property
interest in the subject matter must exist in the attorney at the
same time.64 Thus, where a present interest in mineral rights is
transferred to an attorney in consideration for his services, and
the transfer is not contingent, the attorney has a power coupled
with an interest, and may continue the suit to secure his interest,
although the client may dismiss the action as to himself, thus
terminating his attorney's power of representation. 5
If a client were to give his attorney an interest in property,
not in payment of his fee, as above, but merely as security to
guarantee payment thereof, it would appear that the client could
revoke the attorney's power of representation, but that the at-
torney's interest in property would still be irrevocable. 68 If an
attorney has taken a case on a contingent fee basis, but has not
complied with the contingency fee statute, he is not vested with
a sufficient interest to constitute a mandate coupled with an in-
terest,67 and, therefore, the client may terminate the relation at
will.6 8
In order to protect the attorney's interest in a contingent fee
from the client's power of termination, the Legislature developed
the fourth exception to the general rule. Under the provisions of
R.S. 37:218 the parties may stipulate in a written contract which
provides for a contingent fee that neither party may dismiss, set-
ment, 6 LOYOLA L.J. 90, 95 (1925), citing Hunt v. Rousmanier, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 174 (1823).
64. Marchand v. Gulf Refining Co., 187 La. 1002, 175 So. 647 (1937). See
also Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1243, 1253 (1953).
65. McClung v. Atlas Oil Co., 148 La. 674, 87 So. 515 (1921). Of. Mizer V.
Tennant, 195 La. 1035, 197 So. 748 (1940).
66. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 138-139 (1933); MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE
LAW OF AGENCY §§ 265-271 (4th ed. 1952).
67. The attorney engaged on a contingent fee basis does have a sufficient
interest to carry out necessary legal processes such as requiring the recusation
of a judge related to him within the proscribed degrees (White v. MeClanahan,
133 La. 369, 63 So. 61 (1913), where judge was father of attorney for plaintiff),
or suing under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3547 (1870) for the renewal of a judgment
which he has obtained (Martinez v. Succession of Vives, 32 La. Ann. 305 (1880)).
68. Tennant v. Russell, 214 La. 1046, 39 So.2d 726 (1949) ; Gravity Drainage
Dist. No. 2 v. Edwards, 207 La. 1, 20 So.2d 405 (1944) ; Succession of Rice, 147
La. 834, 86 So. 282 (1920); Succession of Carbajal, 139 La. 481, 71 So. 774
(1916) ; Inman v. Gonzales, 89 So.2d 914 (La. App. 1956). See also Annot., 28
A.L.R.2d 1, 243, 1276 (1953).
Some cases avoid this rule by finding the client has prevented performance by
the attorney; therefore, the contract is considered as having been performed under
the provisions of Article 2040 of the Civil Code, and the attorney may recover
the fee stipulated in the contract. See United Gas Public Service Co. v. Christian,
186 La. 689, 173 So. 174 (1937) (discussed note 57 supra) ; D'Arvicourt v. Seeger,
169 La. 620, 125 So. 735 (1935).
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tle, or otherwise dispose of the case without the consent of the
other.60 This statute modifies the general principle that the cli-
ent retains the power of dismissal. Accordingly, the courts have
construed the statute strictly, and have required a full compli-
ance with all its formalities." Most particularly, the exact stip-
ulation that neither party shall have the right to dispose of the
case must be written into the contract. Where there is no such
provision, it will be presumed to have been intentionally left out
of the contract.71 Furthermore, a copy of the contract must be
served on the opposing litigant and another copy filed with the
clerk of court.72
Power of the Attorney to Terminate the Relation
Generally speaking, upon adequate notice to his client, the
attorney may withdraw when he has good cause, if he can do so
without injury to his client.73 In the event of such a withdrawal
the attorney may recover on a quantum meruit for the services
he has rendered. 74 When the attorney withdraws without good
69. LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950) provides: "By written contract signed by the
client, attorneys at law may acquire as their fee an interest in the subject matter
of the suit, proposed suit, or claim, in the prosecution or defense of which they
are employed, whether the suit or claim be for money or for property. In such a
contract of employment, it may be stipulated that neither the attorney nor the
client may, without the written consent of the other, settle, compromise, release,
discontinue or otherwise dispose of the suit or claim. Either party to the contract
may, at any time, file it with the clerk of the district court in which the suit is
pending or is to be brought and have a copy made and served on the opposing
party and due return made as in case of petitions in ordinary suits. After such
service, any settlement, compromise, discontinuance, or other disposition made of
the suit or claim by either the attorney or the client without the written consent
of the other is null and void and the suit or claim shall be proceeded with as if
no such settlement or discontinuance had been made."
The interest which the attorney acquires in the subject matter of the suit
under a contract drawn in accordance with the provisions of this statute is insuf-
ficient to make him a party to the suit. Roe v. Caldwell, 145 La. 853, 83 So. 43
(1919) ; Smith v. Lyon Cypress Co., 140 La. 507, 73 So. 312 (1916) ; Nix v.
Lancaster and Wight, 3 La. App. 402 (1926).
70. Stiles v. Bruton, 134 La. 523, 64 So. 399 (1914); Acadian Production
Corp. v. Land, 153 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1946) (compromise without attorney's
consent) ; Acadian Production Corp. v. Land, 136 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1943) (attor-
ney gave written consent to dismissal by client).
71. Tennant v. Russell, 214 La. 1046, 39 So.2d 726 (1949).
72. LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950) ; Succession of Carbajal, 139 La. 481, 71 So. 774
(1916) ; Woodley v. Robinson, 100 So.2d 255 (La. App. 1958) (client allowed to
dismiss case where a properly drawn contract had not been filed with the clerk
of court).
73. It has been held that the attorney may withdraw without injury to his
client, if he does so after a decision in the district court, although an appeal is
pending at the time (Fishman v. Conway, 57 So.2d 605 (La. App. 1952) ).
74. Brown v. Green, 132 La. 1090, 62 So. 154 (1913) (necessity of ratifica-
tion) ; Fishman v. Conway, 57 So.2d 605 (La. App. 1952) ; Dowling v. Peyroux,
12 La. App. 551, 126 So. 270 (1930). See also 2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
§ 453 (1914).
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cause, it is generally held that he is not entitled to compensa-
tion.7 5 The attorney is considered as having good cause to with-
draw when he is unable to collect his fee after repeated attempts
to do SO, 76 when the client acts in an obnoxious manner and ex-
presses dissatisfaction with the attorney's services, 77 and when
the client insists on unjust action in the conduct of his case or
the urging of frivolous defenses.7 8
Termination by Operation of Law
Termination of the attorney-client relation by operation of
law appears to have caused very little litigation. Contrary to the
general rule that death of the principal terminates the author-
ity of the agent, where an attorney has been engaged to prose-
cute a suit and the client dies while the suit is in progress, the
attorney has the authority to continue with the suit, unless for-
bidden to do so by one having authority to terminate the rela-
tion.79 But the attorney has no authority to appeal from a final
judgment rendered after his client's death without obtaining the
consent of the heirs or the legal representative of the deceased.8 0
SCOPE OF ATTORNEY'S AUTHORITY
In General
The authority of an attorney at law to act for his client may
be conferred upon him by the client, or may be inferred from the
attorney's exercise of his professional functions in the pursuit
of his delegated powers.8' The power delegated by the client may
be limited to the performance of one specific act, for example,
the collection of a particular debt, or it may be general in scope,
for example, a general retainer to handle all the client's legal
affairs . 2 The delegation of a general power "confers only a
75. 2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 558 (1914). No Louisiana cases were
found on this point, although the rule may be implied from statements in cases
cited in note 74 supra.
76. Dowling v. Peyroux, 12 La. App. 551, 126 So. 270 (1930).
77. Fishman v. Conway, 57 So.2d 605 (La. App. 1952).
78. 21 LA. R.S. ANN. 402-403, Articles of Incorporation, Louisiana State Bar
Association art. 14, § 42 (West 1950). See also 1 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
§ 139 (1914) ; Note, 18 N.C.L. REV. 338 (1940).
79. In re Succession of Labauve, 34 La. Ann. 1187 (1882); Succession of
Liles, 24 La. Ann. 490 (1872).
80. Graham & Anderson v. Hendricks, 24 La. Ann. 477 (1872).
81. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2997, 3000 (1870). For cases dealing with the at-
torney-client relation when treated as other than a mandate see note 51 supra.
82. LA. CiviL CODE art. 2994 (1870). The client may also delegate to an at-
torney at law express or general powers of. attorney, enabling him to act as an
19581
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
power of administration."' 3 Express power must be conferred
for the attorney to have authority "to alienate or give a mort-
gage, or do any other act of ownership, '8 4 as enumerated in Ar-
ticle 2997 of the Civil Code.8 5
Under the provisions of Article 3000, certain powers need
not be specifically granted to a person who is engaged in a pro-
fession, but may be implied. Although this implied power is re-
stricted regarding other transactions, it is broadly construed
with regard to the conduct of litigation.86 It has been held to
include the printing of appeal briefs at the client's expense, 7
and the receiving of payment of a major heir's share of succes-
sion funds.8 8 On the other hand, the attorney has no implied
authority to sell his client's real estate,8 9 to enter into an extra-
judicial partition of a succession, ° or to acknowledge a debt of
his clientY1 It is worthy of note that in the above instances,
where it was found the attorney had no implied authority, the
attorney's acts constituted more than mere administration, and
thus required express authority under the provisions of the
Code.92
Louisiana follows the well-settled rule that the attorney has
no implied authority to engage associate counsel and to bind his
attorney in fact, but the delegation of such power is not considered in the dis-
cussion above.
83. Id. art. 2996.
84. Ibid.
85. Id. art. 2997: "Thus the power must be express and special for the fol-
lowing purposes: To sell or to buy. To incumber or hypothecate. To accept or
reject a succession. To contract a loan or acknowledge a debt. To draw or indorse
bills of exchange or promissory notes. To compromise or refer a matter to arbi-
tration. To make a transaction in matters of litigation; and in general where
things to be done are not merely acts of administration, or such as facilitate such
acts."
Lake v. LeJeune, 226 La. 48, 74 So.2d 899 (1954) (attorney's "acceptance" of
offer to sell real estate held not binding on client where attorney had only general
authority).
86. See p. 709 infra.
87. G. F. Weiss & Co. v. New Orleans, 10 La. Ann. 46 (1855). This case was
decided under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2969 (1825), the forerunner of LA. CIWL CODE
art. 3000 (1870). The court stated that the client could be charged only for the
number of briefs usually required in such cases.
88. Succession of Czarnowski, 15 La. 1093, 105 So. 76 (1925).
89. Lake v. LeJeune, 226 La. 48, 74 So.2d 899 (1954) ; Bordelon v. Crabtree,
216 La. 345, 43 So.2d 682 (1949). However, such acts have been upheld, in
effect, by estoppel. Etie's Heirs v. Cade, 4 La. 383 (1832).
90. Milburn v. Wemple, 156 La. 759, 765, 101 So. 132, 134 (1924). This case
does not cite Article 3000 but avoids the contention that authority should be in-
ferred by treating the extra-judicial partition as a compromise, and citing Article
2997, which requires the attorney to have express power to enter into a com-
promise. See discussion of the authority of the attorney to compromise, infra.
91. Durnford v. Clark's Estate, 3 La. 199, 203 (1831).
92. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2997 (1870).
1958] COMMENTS 707
client for his fee. 93 The client may be bound if he consents to,
or ratifies, such action by his words or conduct.
Authority to Compromise and Make Other Agreements
An attorney at law, like other agents, must have express and
special authority to effect a compromise binding upon his
client.94 Although the attorney's authority to compromise must
be express, it appears that such authority need not be in writing
unless a transfer of immovables is involved. 95 The Civil Code
provides that a transaction or compromise must be reduced to
writing,96 and the general rule is that where the contract made
by an agent must be in writing, the power of the agent to exe-
cute it must be in writing.9 7 Therefore, although most cases
deal only with immovables, the rule that the attorney must have
written authority to compromise presumably would apply to any
compromise whether it involved immovables or movables.9 8
Even though the attorney has no express authority to com-
promise his client's claim, the client may be bound by his attor-
93. Voorhies v. Harrison, 22 La. Ann. 85 (1870). See also Annot., 90 A.L.R.
265, 266 (1934).
94. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2997 (1870) ; Succession of Landry, 117 La. 193, 41
So. 490 (1906); Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Caskey, 13 La. App. 675, 127 So. 46
(1930) (cert. denied); Hotard v. Perrilloux, 8 La. App. 476 (1928). Where
client has vested in his attorney authority (even exclusive authority) to com-
promise his claim, client retains the power to bind himself by compromise with a
third party who has no knowledge of client's contract with his attorney. There can
be no valid compromise where the third person has knowledge of the client's agree-
ment; however, the agreement is effective as between the client and attorney.
Smith v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 112 La. 985, 36 So. 826 (1904) ; Succession of
Jones, 193 La. 360, 190 So. 581 (1939). See also Comment, 14 TUL. L. REV.
282, 285 (1940).
95. Phelps v. Hodge, 6 La. Ann. 524 (1851) (it is to be noted that in this
case, a lower court decision was affirmed because of an equally divided court) ;
Van Vleet Mansfield Drug Co. v. Anders, 157 So. 166, 167 (La. App. 1934).
But 8ee Milburn v. Wemple, 156 La. 759, 765, 101 So. 132, 134 (1924) (where
an extra-judicial partition of both movable and immovable property of a succession
was considered a compromise and held ineffective because authority of the attor-
ney to compromise was not in writing, the court would not give effect to the parti-
tion even as to the movables involved).
96. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3071 (1870). But it has been held that a receipt
signed by the person receiving payment under a compromise is sufficient evidence
to be a written contract as required by this article. Zibilich v. Rittenberg, 18
La. App. 628, 633, 139 So. 309, 312 (1932), citing Kelly v. Homer Compress Co.,
110 La. 983, 985, 35 So. 256, 257 (1903).
97. Hackenburg v. Gartskamp, 30 La. Ann. 898 (1878) ; Badon v. Badon, 4
La. 166 (1832) ; Muggah v. Greig, 2 La. 593 (1831). Cf. Silverstein v. Koppel,
166 La. 1075, 118 So. 224 (1928). This rule is established with regard to con-
tracts involving the transfer of immovables but would seem to apply to other con-
tracts which the Civil Code requires to be in writing.
98. Milburn v. Wemple, 156 La. 759, 101 So. 132 (1924). See also Phelps v.
Hodge, 6 La. Ann. 524, 528 (1851) (dissenting opinion of 'Preston, J., where
equally divided court upheld a compromise made by attorney not having written
authority to compromise).
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ney's act if he ratifies it by his conduct or silence.9 9 Ratification
has been found where the client, with knowledge of the com-
promise, retained the payment made thereunder, 100 where the
client dismissed his suit based upon the compromise, 0 ' and
where (having full knowledge) he failed to express disapproval
of the compromise within a reasonable time and continued nor-
mal correspondence with his attorney. 0 2
If an attorney is engaged to collect a debt or is given the
power to sue therefor, he has the implied authority to accept
partial payments in pro tanto discharge of the debt. 0 3 But the
authority to collect a debt is insufficient to empower an attorney
to compromise it,1°4 and if he exceeds his implied authority by
accepting a partial payment in satisfaction of the whole debt,
the compromise will not bind the client in the absence of ratifi-
cation. However, the payment will discharge the debt pro
tanto.'05
The authority of an attorney at law to acknowledge a debt
or to confess judgment against his client must be express and
cannot be implied from his professional capacity, 06 nor may an
attorney allow claims against a succession which the legal rep-
resentative did not allow or know about.10 7 However, a client
may be estopped to deny his attorney's authority to acknowledge
a debt or to confess judgment. 0
99. Milburn v. Wemple, 156 La. 759, 766, 101 So. 132, 134 (1924). For a
close fact situation involving an agreement by a creditor of an insolvent to parti-
cipate in a composition, see Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Caskey, 13 La. App. 675, 127
So. 46 (1930) (cert. denied).
100. Culverhouse v. Marx, 39 La. Ann. 809, 2 So. 607 (1887). Similarly
where such funds were returned under like circumstances, it has been held that
there was no ratification. Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Caskey, 13 La. App. 675, 127
So. 46 (1930) ; Succession of Jones, 193 La. 360, 190 So. 581 (1939).
101. Zibilich v. Rittenberg, 18 La. App. 628, 139 So. 309 (1932).
102. Dupre v. Splane, 16 La. 51 (1840).
103. Liquidators of Joseph David Co. v. Berthelot Bros., 118 La. 380, 42 So.
971 (1907) ; Pickett v. Bates, 3 La. Ann. 627 (1848).
104. Van Vleet Mansfield Drug Co. v. Anders, 157 So. 166 (La. App. 1934)
Dupre v. Splane, 16 La. 51 (1840).
105. Liquidators of Joseph David Co. v. Berthelot Bros., 118 La. 380, 42 So.
971 (1907) ; Pickett v. Bates, 3 La. Ann. 627 (1848). The debt is discharged
pro taato although the client never actually receives the partial payment (e.g., if
the attorney absconded with the funds). But where there has been a partial pay-
ment the client retains his right to sue for the balance of the debt.
106. Edwards v. Edwards, 29 La. Ann. 597 (1877) ; Hill v. Barlow, 6 Rob.
142, 149 (La. 1843) ; Richard v. Bird, 4 La. 305 (1832) ; Durnford v. Clark's
Estate, 3 La. 199 (1831) ; LA. CrVIL CODE art. 2997 (1870).
107. Succession of Winn, 30 La. Ann. 702 (1878) ; Succession of Poussin, 27
La. Ann. 296 (1875).
108. The attorney's confessing judgment and obtaining a stay of execution
thereon, pursuant to his client's instructions is sufficient to estop the client from
denying the attorney's authority to confess judgment. Maraist, Fournet & Co. v.
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The authority required to submit a question to arbitration
appears to be similar to that required to compromise. It must
be express and cannot be implied from the attorney's profession-
al capacity, and the submission itself must be in writing. 0 9 The
authority to compromise a matter in litigation does not include
the authority to submit to arbitration.110
Except for the Louisiana statute allowing non-compromise
provisions in certain contracts between the attorney and his cli-
ent,"' it appears that the Louisiana rules relating to compromise
and other agreements made by the attorney are substantially in
accord with the rules followed in most other jurisdictions.1 2
Authority to Commence and Conduct Litigation
The attorney authorized to conduct litigation for his client
is vested with broad implied powers. By virtue of this implied
power, a defendant's attorney is presumed to have authority to
waive service of plaintiff's petition," 3 and to accept service of
all other process in the suit.114 The Code of Practice provides
that an attorney at law appointed curator ad hoc for an unrepre-
sented minor or absentee may "waive service of citation and
petition, but shall not waive time or any legal defense."" 15
Caillier, 30 La. Ann. 1087 (1878) (judgment confessed on a promissory note;
execution of judgment stayed for almost a year).
109. King v. King, 104 La. 420, 29 So. 205 (1901); LA. CIVIL CODE arts.
2997, 3071, 3100, 3101 (1870).
110. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2998 (1870).
111. LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950).
112. Annot., 132 Am. St. Rep. 148, 153 (1910); Note, 3 ARK. L. REV. 473
(1949) (non-compromise provisions in attorney-client contracts) ; 5 Am. JUR.,
Attorneys at Law, §§ 96, 98, 99 (1936). But see id. §§ 100 (Arbitration), 101
(Confession of Judgment).
113. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 177 (1870) ; Ingram v. Richardson, 2 La. Ann.
839 (1847) (dicta) ; Dangerfield's Executrix v. Thurston's Heirs, 8 Mart. (N.S.)
232, 235-36 (1829). Defendant may rebut this presumption by an adequate show-
ing that the attorney did not have such authority. Taylor v. Sutton, 6 La. Ann.
709 (1851). The authority of an attorney to collect a debt due his client is in-
sufficient to infer authority to defend a related action against the client. Barnes
v. Profilet, 5 La. Ann. 117 (1850).
114. But, "it is only after citation or the appearance of a defendant through
counsel that service of all other process in the suit may be accepted by his at-
torney of record." Wadsworth v. Alexius, 234 La. 187, 99 So.2d 77, 80 (1958).
LA. R.S. 13:3471(15) (1950). See also LA. R.S. 13:3345 (1950) (where dis-
trict court jurisdiction is concurrent with that of justices of the peace).
115. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 116 (1870). An early case held that waiver
of service by an attorney appointed to represent an absentee defendant could not
be considered to interrupt prescription running on a debt owed to plaintiff-
that such waiver could only be made by defendant personally, or an attorney
employed by him. Hill v. Barlow, 6 Rob. 142 (La. 1843). Today, LA. CODE OF
PRACTICE art. 116 (1870) has given effect to the rule of the Hill case by the
provision that an attorney appointed by the court may not waive any legal de-
fense. Although he may not waive any legal defense, service of notice of the
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In addition, an attorney authorized to conduct litigation is
presumed to have authority to dismiss his client's case or the
appeal thereof ;""6 to authorize the issuance of attachment on his
affidavit when his client is absent from the parish both in cases
where the debt or obligation owed his client is not yet due, and
where the debt is already due ;117 to sign an attachment bond ;11
order of seizure and sale on the attorney appointed by the court to represent the
absentee is sufficient to interrupt prescription running on a note secured by a
mortgage. Williams v. Douglas, 23 La. Ann. 685 (1871). Appointment by the
court to appear for particular unrepresented minors or absentee heirs gives the
attorney the power to waive service and citation as to those particular persons,
but he has no authority to waive such service for the heirs whom he does not
represent. Powell v. Larance, 179 La. 751, 155 So. 13 (1934). Cf. Wadsworth v.
Alexius, 234 La. 187, 99 So.2d 77 (1958).
116. Interdiction of Erichson, 149 La. 895, 90 So. 235 (1921) (evidence of
the attorney's former withdrawal from the case considered insufficient to rebut
presumption of authority); Paxton v. Cobb, 2 La. 137, 140-41 (1830). But cf.
Rogers v. Blitz, 161 So. 613 (La. App. 1935) (attorney has no right to dismiss
unless client is familiar with all the facts and agrees thereto).
117. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 216, 217 (1870). The provision which is
now the second paragraph of Article 216 first appears in La. Acts 1839, No. 53,
§ 16. In the following year the word "attorney," as used in the phrase "agent or
attorney" in the above act, was held to mean attorney at law. Clark v. Morse,
16 La. 575 (1840). This interpretation has been followed by subsequent cases.
Hardy v. Colvin, 43 La. Ann. 851, 9 So. 745 (1891) (an attorney at law has
implied authority to give affidavit for attachment under the provisions of the
Louisiana Code of Practice Article 216, which provisions control the statements
in Article 244 that attachment may be granted on the oath of the creditor or "his
agent or attorney in fact") ; Fulton v. Brown, 10 La. Ann. 350 (1855) (attorney
at law has authority without special procuration) ; Trowbridge Dwight & Co. v.
Weir, 6 La. Ann. 706 (1851); Alexander v. Burns, 6 La. Ann. 704 (1851);
Austin v. Latham, 19 La. 88 (1841) (attorney at law who gave affidavit for
attachment need not state he was attorney in fact). Cf. First National Bank v.
Drexler, 184 So. 607, 613 (La. App. 1938). But see Rockholt Lumber Co. v.
Mississippi Valley Constr. Co., 66 So.2d 359, 361 (1953) (dictum) ; LA. CODE OF
PRACTICE art. 244 (1870) (this article applies where the debt is not yet due;
under the holding in Hardy v. Colvin, supra, this article may well include attor-
neys at law as well as attorneys in fact) ; LA. R.S. 13:3954 (1950) (this statute
applies where the debt is already due and states that the oath authorizing the
issuance of attachment "may be made by the agent or attorney of the creditor").
In giving his affidavit for attachment the attorney need not affirmatively
state that his client is absent from the parish; his absence may be proved on trial.
Moore v. Gordon, 153 So. 485 (La. App. 1934), noted in 8 Tur. L. REV. 599
(1934) (this note provides a discussion of the attorney's authority to give af-
fidavits and a more detailed historical background of Article 216 of the Code of
Practice). However, the affidavit of an attorney at law is insufficient to obtain
a writ of mandamus. Porteau v. Gluck, 149 La. 651, 89 So. 886 (1921).
118. The authority to sign an attachment bond may be implied when the at-
torney is given a general power to collect a debt, as well as when he is authorized
to collect a debt through court action. The signing of an attachment bond is held
to be merely an act of administration necessary in the client's attempting to ob-
tain payment; for this reason it is well established that the attorney at law does
not need special authority to execute such a bond for his client. Fulton v. Brown,
10 La. Ann. 350 (1855); Trowbridge Dwight & Co. v. Weir, 6 La. Ann. 706
(1851) ; Alexander v. Burns, 6 La. Ann. 704 (1851) ; Austin v. Latham, 19 La.
88 (1841) ; Craig v. Yorke, Gunby's Dec. 44 (La. App. 1885) (stating that the
term "attorney in fact" in LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 245 (1870) means "at-
torney at law"). This decision seems correct in the light of the cases in the pre-
ceding footnote. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 245 (1870).
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to request a continuance, on his affidavit;119 and to consent to
delays in favor of the opposing attorney.120 But it appears that
he has no implied authority to execute an injunction bond and
may do so only when specifically authorized by his client, or
when the client is not present to do 80.121
There seems to be some conflict in the cases as to whether
an attorney authorized to conduct litigation has implied author-
ity to release an obligation which another person owes his client.
Two early cases held that an attorney has no implied authority
to release an obligation of warranty owed to the client by a wit-
ness in order to enable the witness to testify for the client.'
2
The view taken was that the attorney must have special author-
ity to bind his client by such a release. On the other hand, in
Lagonda Corp. v. Cancasci,28 a later case, the attorney for a
lessor made a voluntary remission (in open court) of the lessee-
defendant's obligation to pay rent for the period remaining
under the lease after the lessee had abandoned the premises.
This remission was held binding on the lessor. As the attorney
in this case did not have any express power to alienate his cli-
ent's rights, the remission must have been considered within the
scope of the powers implied from his authority to conduct litiga-
tion. These decisions may possibly be reconciled on their facts.
In the early cases the obligations which the attorney attempted
to release were only incidental to the client's claim and were not
119. The court has great discretionary powers as to when a continuance should
be granted. However, an affidavit reciting that a material witness is absent in
spite of diligent attempts to summon him prior to trial is sufficient to obtain a
continuance. Penne v. Tourne, 2 La. 462 (1830). But cf. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE
art. 466 (1870). However, merely reciting that new evidence has been discovered
is inadequate to justify the court's granting a continuance without some showing
that the client was not at fault in failing to discover such evidence earlier. Marie
v. Avart's Heirs, 10 Mart.(O.S.) 25 (La. 1821) ; LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 464
(1870).
120. Consenting to such delays is often a matter of professional courtesy, and
the attorney clearly has the authority to make such concessions, thereby binding
his client. The client has no right to demand that his attorney "be illiberal" re-
garding such matters. Brooks v. Cavanaugh, 11 La. Ann. 183 (1856); 21 LA.
R.S. ANN. 396 (Articles of Incorporation, Louisiana State Bar Association, art.
14, J 24) (West 1950).
121. Gauthier v. Gardenal, 44 La. Ann. 884, 11 So. 463 (1892); Bank of
Louisiana v. Wilson, 19 La. Ann. 1 (1867). An applicant for either a temporary
restraining order (LA. R.S. 13:4064 (1950)) or for a preliminary injunction
(LA. R.S. 13:4068 (1950)) must furnish an adequate bond. The Revised Statutes
on injunction supersede the related provisions in LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 304
(1870).
122. Succession of Weigel, 18 La. Ann. 49 (1866) ; Succession of Stocking,
6 La. Ann. 229 (1851) (witness in each case had transferred to client-plaintiff
the claim he was seeking to enforce).
123. 4 So.2d 775 (La. App. 1941).
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at issue in the case; whereas, in the Cancasci case the obligation
released was at issue before the court and was part of the claim
that the plaintiff-client had authorized his attorney to enforce.
It is submitted that a voluntary remission, such as that in the
Cancasci case is too broad an extension of the attorney's implied
powers derived from his authority to conduct litigation. Such a
remission should not properly come within the attorney's implied
powers, for (as the court indicated) the remission was unneces-
sary to the client's case, and he could in no way benefit from
such remission. 124 It appears that the deprivation of a right of
the client without any foreseeable benefit to him is not the type
of function to come properly within the attorney's implied pow-
ers. 125 On the other hand, the early cases seem to restrict these
powers too much, for releasing an interested witness' incidental
obligation to the client in order that the witness may testify is
clearly to the client's benefit and may be a necessary part of
proving the client's case. For these reasons it would seem that
a release such as involved in the early cases is properly within
the attorney's implied powers.
It is clear that the implied powers of an attorney of record
do not cease with the rendition of judgment, for he not only has
the authority to receive service of notice of judgment, but such
service is required by law. Thus, service of notice of judgment
in district and city courts must be made "to all the parties to the
suit, through their attorneys of record, or on the parties, if not
represented by attorneys.' 1 26 This provision has been held to
mean that service on the party himself, where he is represented
by an attorney of record, is insufficient and will justify the an-
nulment of a default judgment thereby obtained.127
In a few instances the attorney's authority to conduct litiga-
124. Id. at 777.
125. The authority of an attorney to alienate a right of his client by means of
his powers implied under Civil Code Article 3000 should be strictly construed.
The basis for this contention is that the Code specifies that the power to alienate
must be expressly given (Articles 2996, 2997), and even a delegation of general
power gives only a power of administration (Article 2996). As an administrator
the attorney should act only for his client's benefit. Where the express power to
alienate is given, the attorney may deprive his client of property, even though
such action may not be to his benefit. To allow the attorney under his implied
power to dispose of his client's rights where such action in no way benefits the
client is to vest in him, by virtue of his implied powers, a full power to alienate.
It would appear that a better course of action would be to restrict the attorney's
implied powers to those acts which he could perform under a general power rather
than extending them to acts for which the Code requires express power to be given.
126. LA. R.S. 13:3344 (1950).
127. Alonso v. Bowers, 222 La. 1093, 64 So.2d 443 (1953).
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tion, in effect, gives him an implied power to deprive his client
of property. It has been held that an attorney, by virtue of his
implied authority, may remit the portion of a judgment in his
client's favor which is excessive either because of an error in
calculation of damages prayed for by plaintiff's attorney, or be-
cause the jury award exceeds the damages which plaintiff re-
quested. 128  Here the attorney's power is implied to avoid in-
justice to the other litigants. 129 However, the general rule is that
an attorney must have special authority to alienate, either by
assignment or sale, a judgment in favor of his client.180 The im-
plied authority of the attorney to request a stay of execution on
a judgment rendered against his client has long been recog-
nized.'l '
The attorney's authority to appeal from a judgment ren-
dered against his client and to take the steps necessary to perfect
the appeal may be implied from his authority to conduct litiga-
tion. Thus, today, contrary to the former rule, the attorney of
record for any party may accept service of citation of appeal
whether his client resides in the state or not,'l 2 and may execute
an appeal bond for his client.1 This rule also applies to an at-
torney who has been appointed curator ad hoc for an absentee.18 4
But an attorney who has been discharged has no authority to
128. Guay v. Andrews, 8 La. Ann. 141 (1853) ; Morgan Dorsey & Co. v. Their
Creditors, 19 La. 84 (1841) ; Mead v. Buckner, 2 La. 282 (1831).
129. In these examples the judgment rendered in the client's favor might be
considered property vested in the client and the partial remission by the attorney
therefore a deprivation of his client's property. However, such a remission by the
attorney is actually more an act to correct an injustice through a procedural error
than it is a real deprivation of the client's property.
130. Walden v. Grant, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 565 (La. 1830). Where an assignment
is made without special authority and without the client's knowledge, the pur-
chaser does not acquire title to the judgment, nor does the client's receipt of
money paid to the attorney ratify the transfer. Campbell v. McKnight, Gunby's
Dec. 44 (La. App. 1885).
131. Maraist, Fournet & Co. v. Caillier, 30 La. Ann. 1087 (1878).
132. Wiltz v. Home Building & Loan Ass'n, 24 So.2d 204 (La. App. 1945)
(LA. R.S. 13:3471(15) (1950) supersedes LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 582 (1870),
when a party is represented by an attorney of record who has not formally with-
drawn from the case).
Older cases achieved the same result by the presumption that the attorney of
record had authority to accept service of petition and order of appeal. Wood &
Roane v. Wood, 32 La. Ann. 801 (1880) ; Hill v. Bowden, 3 La. Ann. 258 (1848) ;
Conrey v. Brenham, 1 La. Ann. 397 (1846). But 8ee Leglise v. His Creditors, 4
Mart. (N.S.) 238 (La. 1826).
133. Bank of Louisiana v. Wilson, 19 La. Ann. 1, 3 (1867) (dictum) ; Trow-
bridge Dwight & Co. v. Weir, 6 La. Ann. 706 (1851) (dictum). But a wife's
attorney is not presumed to have the authority to execute an appeal bond in the
husband's name where he is not a party to the suit. Gibson v. Hitchcock, 35 La.
Ann. 1201 (1883).
134. Bach v. Ballard, 13 La. Ann. 487 (1858).
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give bond and to prosecute an appeal, 135 and where his client dies
after a final judgment in an inferior court, the attorney at law
may appeal only after obtaining the consent of the heirs or the
legal representative of the deceased.'3 6 Following the general
rules applicable to the attorney's authority, an attorney at law
having only general authority cannot bind his client by a gratui-
tous waiver of the client's right to appeal.18 7
Authority to Receive Payment
Where the services of an attorney at law are retained to col-
lect a debt, he has implied authority to receive payment in
money, and such payments to him will discharge the debtor.18 8
As previously indicated, the attorney also has the implied au-
thority to accept partial payments in pro tanto satisfaction of
his client's claim.3 9 But he has no implied authority to extend
the time for payment of a note placed in his hands, 140 or to com-
promise his client's claim.' 4'
135. Planters' Lumber Co. v. Sugar Cane By-Products Co., 162 La. 123, 110
So. 172 (1926) ; Ikerd v. Borland, 35 La. Ann. 337 (1883).
136. Stith v. Winbush, 3 La. 442 (1831).
137. S. -. Keoughan & Co. v. Equitable Oil Co., 116 La. 773, 41 So. 88
(1906). See page ... supra. For a contract form emphasizing the requirement of
consent of both parties as a requirement to the prosecution of an appeal, see 1
AM. JuR., Legal Forms Ann. 1803 (1953).
138. The attorney has such authority to receive payment where he is authorized
to sue to collect the debt. Succession of Czarnowske, 158 La. 1093, 105 So. 76
(1925) ; Mayor v. Flennen, 18 La. 428 (1841) ; Nolan v. Rogers, 4 Mart. (N.S.)
145 (La. 1826) ; LAx. CIvIrL CODE art. 2143 (1870). But authority to defend a
client is insufficient to imply authority to receive proceeds of the client's property
sold in satisfaction of judgment in the suit. Germaine v. Mallerich, 31 La. Ann.
371 (1879). Cf. Lambeth v. Mayor, 6 La. 731 (1834). He also has such au-
thority where the holder of a promissory note places it in his hands for collection.
Woodrow v. Hennen, 6 Mart.(N.S.) 156 (La. 1.827) (authority to collect may
be supported by evidence of actual collection) ; Spengler v. Drouet, 6 La. App.
624 (1927).
Where payment is made to the attorney by check payable to client, it is doubt-
ful whether the attorney has the implied authority to endorse the instrument.
"Authority to receive an instrument payable to the order of the client does not
imply the authority of the agent to endorse his name. The modern rule seems to
be that if it is necessary for the attorney in effectuating the main authority con-
ferred, to make an endorsement, such authority will be implied." Witherspoon,
May an Attorney Endorse Client's Name, 58 Cox. L.J. 213 (1953). See also
Note, 27 So. CALIF. L. REV. 463 (1954).
139. Liquidators of Joseph )avid Co. v. Berthelot Bros., 11 La. 380, 42 So.
971 (1907) ; Pickett v. Bates, 3 La. Ann. 627 (1848).
140. Roberts v. Smith, 3 La. Ann. 205 (1848) ; Millaudon v. M'Micken, 7
Mart.(N.S.) 34 (La. 1828). Such an extension of time, if valid, would release
the sureties on the note and would be more than an act of mere administration.
141. Dupre v. Splane, 16 La. 51, 54 (1840). See page ... supra.
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Although the attorney authorized to collect a debt need not
have express power to receive payment in legal tender,142 he
must be given express power to receive, or to agree to receive,
payment in other than legal tender.148 Express power must be
given to authorize the attorney to accept a note in payment of a
debt or judgment in his client's favor.144
Ratification of Attorney's Unauthorized Acts
A client will be bound by the unauthorized acts of his attor-
ney if the court finds that he has ratified such acts either by
his silence or by his conduct. 145 For the client to have ratified
his attorney's unauthorized acts in either manner, he must have
had adequate knowledge of the transaction at the time of ratifi-
cation.146 The client has been held bound by the unauthorized
acts of his attorney where, with adequate knowledge, he has re-
mained silent for an unreasonable time,'147 has silently accepted
for a long period the benefit of his attorney's acts, 4 has re-
142. Succession of Czarnowski, 158 La. 1093, 1097, 105 So. 76, 77 (1925);
Davis v. Lee, 20 La. Ann. 248 (1868) ; Garthwaite, Wheeler & Co. v. Wentz, 19
La. Ann. 196 (1867) ; Railey & Campbell v. Bagley, 19 La. Ann. 172 (1867) ;
Phelps v. Preston, 9 La. Ann. 488 (1854) ; Nolan v. Rogers, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 145,
146 (La. 1826) ; Williams v. Metropolitan Bank, 3 Orl. App. 471, 473 (La. App.
1906). See also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2143 (1870).
143. Davis v. Lee, 20 La. Ann. 248 (1868) ; Railey & Campbell v. Bagley, 19
La. Ann. 172 (1867) ; Phelps v. Preston, 9 La. Ann. 488 (1854) ; Perkins v.
Grant, 2 La. Ann. 328 (1847) ; Williams v. Metropolitan Bank, 3 Orl. App. 471,
473 (La. App. 1906) (writ of review refused).
144. Dunbar v. Morris, 3 Rob. 278 (La. 1842); Greenwell v. Roberts, 7 La.
63 (1834) ; Hicky v. Sharp, 4 La. 335 (1832) ; Millaudon v. M'Micken, 7 Mart.
(N.S.) 34 (La. 1828) ; Nolan v. Rogers, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 145 (La. 1826). But
the attorney may have the judgment debtor deduct the amount of the attorney's
note to the extent of his fixed fee. Williams v. Metropolitan Bank, 3 Orl. App.
471 (La. 1906) (writ of review refused). Even where an attorney of record had
authority to "make any arrangement for the debt which was for their [his clients']
interest," his authority was held insufficient to empower him to accept a note and
mortgage in satisfaction of his clients' judgment. Greenwell v. Roberts, 7 La. 63,
65 (1834).
145. Milburn v. Wemple, 156 La. 759, 766, 101 So. 132 (1924); LA. CIVIL
CODE arts. 3010, 3021 (1870). See also 5 AM. JUR., Attorneys at Law, § 71
(1936).
146. Blythe v. Hall, 169 La. 1120, 126 So. 679 (1930) ; Campbell v. McKnight,
Gunby's Dec. 44 (2d Cir. 1885). Mere knowledge of the proceeding is insufficient
to imply knowledge that an attorney appearing therein purports to represent all
of the heirs in a partition suit. Wadsworth v. Alexius, 234 La. 187, 99 So.2d 77
(1958).
147. Brooks v. Poirier, 10 La. Ann. 512 (1855) (silent for eight years).
148. Mason v. Stewart, 6 La. Ann. 736 (1851) (oath of party insufficient to
overcome five years' acceptance) ; Dupre v. Splane, 16 La. 51 (1840). Cf. Flower
v. Jones & Gilmore, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 140 (1828) (acceptance of accounts rendered
by agent for six years).
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ceived and retained the proceeds from the unauthorized con-
duct,149 or has invoked judicial process to confirm such action. 150
Charles B. Sklar
Land Occupier's Liability to Trespassers
In recent times, the traditional rule that a land occupier is
liable to a trespasser only if the land occupier is guilty of fla-
grant misconduct has been considerably altered. Although the
trespasser still cannot recover for many injuries for which a per-
son lawfully upon the premises can recover, the courts have im-
posed certain duties upon land occupiers to avoid injuring tres-
passers. It is the purpose of this Comment to analyze these
duties.'
The trespasser is a person whose presence upon land is with-
out any claim of right secured by the permission of the occupier.2
The occupier's permission may extend only to a portion of the
premises. Thus a person, lawfully upon the premises by virtue
of the occupier's consent, will nevertheless be considered a tres-
passer by entering into that part of the premises that he is not
authorized to enter.3
The degree of care required of the occupier to trespassers is
considerably less than what is owed to those lawfully on the
premises. 4 This partial immunity from liability to trespassers
149. Simon v. Barnett, 169 La. 642, 125 So. 743 (1930) ; Culverhouse v. Marx,
39 La. Ann. 809 (1887) ; Beau v. Drew, 15 La. Ann. 461 (1860) ; Campbell v.
McKnight, Gunby's Dec. 44 (2d Cir. 1885).
150. Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Henry Ericsson Co., 197 La. 732,
2 So.2d 195 (1941) (applied to court to confirm arbitration award) ; Camors &
Co. v. Losch, Mannings Unreported Cases 95 (garnishment of proceeds paid to
attorney under unauthorized settlement). Cf. Zibilich v. Rittenberg, 8 La. App.
628, 139 So. 309 (1932) (requested dismissal of original suit based on compro-
mise).
1. However, this discussion will not treat liability of land occupiers under the
attractive nuisance doctrine, which involves injuries to trespassing children due
to defective conditions of the premises. For a treatment of this doctrine, see Com-
ment, The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine in Louisiana, 10 LoUISIANA LAW RE-
vizw 469 (1950).
2. Lynch v. American Brewing Co., 127 La. 848, 54 So. 123 (1911). See also
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 329 (1938).
3. Gray v. Elgutter, 5 La. App. 315 (1926) (maid entered into an unopened
apartment she was not supposed to clean).
4. Those persons coming onto the land of another have been classified into
three distinct groups by the courts, and the degree of the land occupier's obliga-
tion differs in each case. (1) The invitee is a person who comes upon the prop-
erty for some reason beneficial to the land occupier and with the land occupier's
express or implied invitation. See Gosey v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 100 So.2d
